



AMERICAN, CHINESE, AND INDIAN TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES: CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

December 2021

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ABOUT USCET

The US-China Education Trust, founded in 1998, is committed to building mutual understanding and dialogue between the two great Pacific powers. As the United States and China confront increasing frictions, USCET programs have grown in importance and urgency. Successfully navigating the pandemic, USCET continues to strengthen people-to-people relations, in particular through partnerships at the university level. In its first two decades, USCET built a strong network of Chinese universities that carry out American Studies and new media research and teaching, working with them to hold conferences and dialogues among leading American and Chinese experts to better educate Chinese and Americans about one another. In its third decade, as USCET launches its association with George Washington University, it is expanding student-to-student dialogues and educational programming to enhance two-way connections. As anti-Asian sentiments in the US rise alongside a deteriorating US-China relationship, USCET's mission has also been extended to incorporate a more nuanced understanding of the contemporary issues affecting the Asian diaspora within the larger context of US-China relations, as part of its larger mission to build understanding and support a more constructive US-China relationship.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


This report is the result of the dedication and collaboration of a group of experts from the United States, China, and India, who are committed to understanding the changing geopolitical, economic, and people-to-people dynamics affecting the Indo-Pacific regional order. The US-China Education Trust (USCET) is grateful to Peking University (PKU) and its Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding (IGCU) for their attention and guidance over the course of this Trilateral Perspectives series.

A very special thanks goes to Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, USCET Special Advisor and author of this report, for lending her knowledge, experience, editorial skills and leadership to this initiative drawing on her long career as a U.S. diplomat. We are especially grateful to her for guiding this Trilateral Perspectives series from inception to report launch despite complications brought on by the coronavirus pandemic.

Our thanks extend to the speakers who provided their valuable time and expertise. We were fortunate to have the opportunity to exchange views with a group of experts who have held senior positions in the U.S., Chinese and Indian governments, as well as in a variety of other institutions, including the Center for Economic and Social Progress in New Delhi, the National University of Singapore, the Institute of South Asian Studies, China Academy of Modern International Relations, the Belfer Center at Harvard University, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., the China Association of Military Sciences, the Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi, and the Center for Naval Analysis, Washington, D.C.

This Trilateral Perspectives series and the report would not be possible without the support of USCET staff and interns. Thanks, particularly, go to Trenton Marsolek, who extended invaluable support by organizing meetings, providing technical services, coordinating with our Chinese partners, and editing drafts to produce and promote this report.

Although we sought the advice of many, USCET and the author are ultimately responsible for the final content of this report, which we dedicate to all those who are committed to setting U.S.-China relations on a constructive path.



Julia Chang Bloch

President

US-China Education Trust

INTRODUCTION

During the first two decades of this century, the global landscape has changed dramatically. Consider:

- The regional order in the Indo-Pacific area is changing, and the United States, China and India have different goals for the future regional order.
- The Trump administration in the U.S. has left a legacy of uncertainty about some hitherto very durable aspects of its global policy.
- Both political and economic turbulence have weakened some of the multilateral institutions that undergird the rules-based international order.
- All three of the countries discussed in this report have embarked on significant military modernization efforts.
- U.S.-China and India-China relations are at the lowest point in decades.
- The international weight of China has expanded, along with its maritime presence in the South China Sea. The border clash with India in the summer of 2020 caused the first deaths in hostile action in 45 years.
- India's international heft has also increased, its economy surging ahead at least until the pandemic struck.
- Global economic production has shifted away from the G7 industrial powers (from 44 percent of the global total to 25-30 percent).
- After several decades of steady increase, the share of global trade in economic production has fluctuated between 50 and 43 percent with the economic disruptions from the pandemic¹.

The coronavirus pandemic is being blamed for these trends. In fact, it did not create them, but has accelerated many of them. It contributed heavily to a drop in global merchandise trade in 2020. It has dislocated life all around the world, imposing a crushing economic burden on many countries and disrupting global supply chains. While many countries – including the three subjects of this report – expect to bounce back as the pandemic ebbs, the timing of the world's emergence from the pandemic is uncertain, the speed of economic recovery is unclear, and the impact of all this disruption on different sectors of their economies even more so.²

These economic stressors have inevitably come with political strains as well. Countries around the world have drawn inward – a trend conspicuous in India, China, and the United States. This has taken many forms, including a drive to “re-shore” more industrial production, an appeal to nationalist sentiment, and reduced patience with the outside world.

Against this unsettled background, the U.S.-China Education Trust, in partnership with the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding (iGCU) at Peking University, decided in

¹World Trade Indicators, World Bank web site, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS?view=chart>, June 11, 2021.

²World Trade Organization, Press release, March 21, 2021, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres21_e/pr876_e.htm.

early 2020 to organize a trilateral dialogue bringing together prominent diplomats, academics and researchers from the three key stakeholders in the regional security order – the United States, China, and India. The objective was to deepen understanding of key perspectives on the Indo-Pacific, highlight areas of policy convergence, and bring to light points of difference. We hope that this discussion will pave the way for more robust security dialogue and cooperation involving the United States, China, and India at a time when the region needs it.

The trilateral dialogue took the form of a series of webinars featuring expert speakers from each of these countries, and an invited audience of similarly knowledgeable and experienced people. The webinars focused on four key aspects of relations among these three players:

- The changing global order and regional governance
- Maritime security in the Indo-Pacific
- The new geoeconomics of Asia
- Understanding and managing strategic mistrust.

Participants were drawn from a variety of institutions, including the Center for Economic and Social Progress in New Delhi, the National University of Singapore, the Belfer Center at Harvard University, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., the Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi, and the Center for Naval Analysis, Washington, D.C.³

The speakers, as we expected, presented quite different perspectives on each of these themes. Overall, this dialogue presented a sobering message about the challenges and potential dangers in the regional situation. Most of the speakers agreed that the leadership of these three countries should make avoiding war their top priority, and that this would by no means happen automatically. They also identified a few topics that might lend themselves to cooperation and, ultimately, to creating the foundations for a less volatile mix of regional relationships.

The report that follows presents in some detail what we learned from the speakers and draws on other sources as well to clarify the context. This report would not have been possible without the wisdom and incisive observations of all the speakers and other participants. If this project succeeds in identifying a path toward a less volatile and more prosperous future for the Indo-Pacific region, it is thanks to their contribution.

Errors of judgment and mistakes are the author's alone. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of USCET or iGCU.

³ A full list of speakers and other participants, as well as the titles and dates of the webinars, are included as an appendix to this report.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The pace of change in global relations and economic patterns has accelerated in the last twenty years. The center of gravity of the global economy has shifted toward Asia. China and India have had a long run of economic growth. Both have a growing profile in the world and expect that trend to continue. The Trump years made the U.S. a less predictable actor, and some of that concern still remains. Exacerbating these tensions, China's relations with both India and the United States are at a low point.

The coronavirus pandemic has been blamed for all these unsettling trends, but a closer look would suggest that it has accelerated forces that were already at work. This report describes an extended dialogue on U.S.-India-China Perspectives on Indo-Pacific Security and Cooperation. Sponsored by the U.S.-China Education Trust and the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding at Peking University, the dialogue brought together in four Webinars experts from all three countries to reflect on the regional order, the three countries' goals, and the roots of strategic mistrust among them. It concludes with recommendations for addressing the strategic mistrust.

THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

The term "global order" is reasonably well understood, but the Indo-Pacific regional order is harder to define and address. There is no region-wide compact or framework. Global economic institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization play an important role. Regional organizations do as well. All three countries in this report belong to ASEAN-related forums. ASEAN's network of dialogue partners and other affiliations give the organization a platform for convening wider discussions. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has become a valued forum for the United States, India, Australia, and Japan, but is looked on with suspicion by China. These and other regional institutions could provide a context for establishing regional norms and reducing unintended frictions.

However, the three countries in this report have different goals with respect to regional norms. China sees it as reasonable to ask for reform of some part of the world order that was established in the wake of World War II so as to better suit today's circumstances. India is determined to be part of any rulemaking process and has a strong interest in freedom of navigation. The United States, which aims to retain its dominant position, supports current norms. The participation of all stakeholders in rule-making that affects them is generally accepted in principle but has not always been implemented in practice.

The three countries all consider the Indo-Pacific region part of their security area but have different priorities. China now asserts claims in the South China Sea that overlap with those of other claimants. It has increased its presence in the Indian Ocean. India is increasing its trade with Southeast and East Asia and also increasing its presence in the region. The U.S. is expanding its interest in the Indian Ocean.

There are an impressive number of potential conflicts that affect the region. The one “hot” border involving these three countries is in the Himalayas, where China and India had one of the most serious clashes in the summer of 2020, the first Indian fatalities in hostile action in 45 years.

Speakers from the U.S. and India noted that a major challenge for all of them would be China’s increasing economic and military power, and regional responses to it. A speaker from India argued that three key drivers for the next few years would be how China uses its expanded power; how the U.S. responds; and India’s openness to engaging with both.

Divergent goals have, not surprisingly, led to a growing level of strategic mistrust, defined as the mutual distrust of long-term intentions. Building trust does not happen automatically but can be encouraged by dialogue and by having countries work together in a practical way to address concrete problems.

Speakers from all three countries saw global issues like climate change and preparing for future pandemics as the most promising arena for cooperation.

MARITIME SECURITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

The decision to focus on maritime security reflects the growing importance of the maritime domain in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. interest in this region has always had a strong maritime flavor, and India and China also see the seas in the region as critical to their security. All three countries share an interest in peace and stability, and the discussion reflected serious concern about accident prevention and about preventing crises from getting out of control. War prevention emerged as the most important topic of discussion.

Chinese perspective: A Chinese speaker, noting that the Biden Administration now referred to China as a “strategic competitor” of the United States, argued that Washington’s fundamental concern was the rise of China as a maritime power. The U.S. objected to China’s actions to defend its interests and saw these as aimed at ending U.S. dominance. India’s role had changed. The U.S. naval posture seemed aimed at improving India’s leverage over China. China regarded competition between large powers as normal. The important thing was to keep it peaceful.

Indian perspective: An Indian speaker, noting the dramatic change in India-U.S. relations in the past three decades, proposed looking at the maritime domain along three axes. The first was security, which did not lend itself to cooperation at this time. The second, economic factors, still had an “open window” for cooperation. The third and most important in the long term was climate change. He argued that it was critical to maintain dialogue and to prevent strategic misperceptions, even if the path to genuine cooperation was difficult.

U.S. perspective: A U.S. speaker started by summarizing U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific: access to Asia; alliance relationships; upholding the standards set in the UNCLOS (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea), standards that the U.S. observed and defended even without being a signatory to UNCLOS; and helping India become a security provider in the region. U.S. policies were likely to include continued concern about active maritime disputes, such as

Mischief Reef (or *Meiji Jiao* in Chinese) and the Scarborough Shoal (or *Huangyan Dao* in Chinese), and support for the Quad.

Potential areas for cooperation: The theme running through the discussion of cooperation was the critical importance of preventing a crisis from escalating. Anti-terrorism and anti-piracy could be areas for cooperation, and accident prevention was crucial. But at this dangerous time, vigilance about any risk of escalation was the most important imperative.

THE NEW GEO-ECONOMICS OF ASIA

In contrast to the discussion on maritime security, the conversation about economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific seemed to include a recognition that, despite the competition in the economic domain, there was also a substantial common interest among the three countries. A Chinese speaker used the phrase “benign competition.”

Perspective from India: An Indian speaker led off with a look at the profound changes in patterns of economic production in the preceding thirty years. To take one dramatic example, the gross domestic product of the BRICS countries⁴ was now larger than the share of the G-7 countries. Adapting to these changes, however, will be messy. A century ago, adjusting to the changes of the industrial revolution went through two world wars and a Great Depression. The pandemic has led many countries – including the three in this report – to turn inward. Economic institutions are having a difficult time, with the best example being the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Perspective from China: A Chinese speaker, observing that India and China are the world’s two largest developing countries, added that both favor “de-polarization.” He suggested that they work together on free trade and on reforming and updating economic institutions. He cited China’s support for India at the time of the devastating second wave of the pandemic as an example of China-India solidarity.

Perspective from the United States: A speaker from the U.S. argued that economic patterns were already changing before the Pandemic, with new industries developing, as well as new supply chains. Technological change was accelerating. International trade, however, was in trouble. Ironically, both the United States and China, which had benefited greatly from the current trade system, had contributed to its present problems.

Turning to regional relationships, he said that the logic of the Chinese “dual circulation” system – the effort to rely more on China’s large internal market for economic growth, without giving up on the export market – would ultimately be to fold the smaller regional countries into some sort of “tributary state” system.

As for U.S. policy, he argued that the two most important areas of continuity between former President Trump and President Biden were on China policy and on trade. Biden was working hard to rebuild U.S. alliance systems. He said that US policymakers have not yet

⁴ Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

recognized the scope of the Indo-Pacific region's transformation. Asian countries, on the other hand, have difficulty distinguishing between government policy and the greater adaptability of the private sector.

Self-reliance and trade policy: All three of the countries in this report have turned inward and are in greater or lesser degree trying to “re-shore” economic production. An Indian and a U.S. speaker rejected the suggestion that bringing production “home” was the only way to build up economic resilience. They noted that diversifying sources of supply, becoming less dependent on foreign aid, and avoiding overvalued exchange rates could all contribute to the same objective.

MANAGING STRATEGIC DISTRUST

Strategic distrust has long been a feature of the relationships this report examines. The U.S.-China relationship was reopened 50 years ago. In that time, distrust has not been seen at the current level of intensity. Speakers from all three countries all noted that distrust resulted primarily from conflicting national interests. All three underscored the importance of managing problems and expanding communication, with the critical objective of avoiding war.

Perspective from China: Explaining the divergent interests, a speaker from China cited power imbalances and divergent goals and expectations within the region. The U.S. statement that China was a “strategic competitor” represented a fundamental change in U.S. policy. Managing this relationship was the greatest challenge of the 21st Century. Neither the U.S. nor India believed that China could rise peacefully. Their multilateral relationships in and beyond the region – notably the Quad – would not succeed in enhancing security at the expense of other countries. Competition and cooperation were both normal conditions in international relations, but the challenge now was to “put a cage” around strategic competition.

Perspective from India. A speaker from India asked two questions: why the mistrust, and what should be done about it?

He cited clashing interests as the main cause, noting that China was the only great power that was unhappy with India's rise. He observed that China, in explaining its current bad relations with India, also blamed divergent interests. China also, in his view, believed that third party relationships, like those between India and the U.S., would inevitably influence relations with China.

The most important remedy for this situation, he said, was to manage change, including the ongoing change in the regional and international orders. Countries should follow their enlightened self-interest, defined in a way that makes cooperation possible.

Perspective from the U.S.: The U.S. speaker too started with divergent geopolitical goals. China sought to recover its centrality; other Asian countries aim to preserve their autonomy; and the U.S. wants to create “robust multipolarity” in Asia. These goals were rooted in the structure of the region and unlikely to change. U.S. goals depended on a balance of power favorable to U.S. and broader Asian interests. The speaker noted that geography predisposed the countries on China's periphery to share the U.S. goal of preventing the domination of a hegemon on the

Eurasian landmass. He concluded by arguing that the most important goal for all three countries was to prevent a war, and that success in that goal would be a great accomplishment.

Discussion: The tension between China's sense of centrality and the current U.S. military preponderance generated much of the discussion. From that perspective, the Taiwan issue was the most important potential flashpoint for the U.S. and China. Another recurring theme was the importance of expanding and deepening communications. A speaker from India suggested breaking problems into manageable parts to facilitate finding constructive outcomes.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The recommendations arising out of this rich discussion fall into three broad categories: dialogue; accident prevention; and subject-specific cooperation.

Dialogue: There is considerable experience with successful dialogues between China and the U.S. and between China and India. Of particular importance:

- Regular exchanges on hot issues, with continuity among the participants, to build an expectation that they can be mitigated diplomatically.
- Higher level quiet strategic discussions which can explore more deeply broad security and geopolitical issues, and can develop mutual understandings on deterrence, competition and cooperation, guardrails, and ground rules.
- Narrower and more concrete dialogues, useful in their own right and also potential entry points to more far-reaching discussions.

Accident prevention: These recommendations focused heavily on the maritime domain.

- Informal operating protocols to prevent unintended aircraft threats to military vessels. This type of regime was used between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for many years.
- Similar deconfliction arrangements for submarines, unmanned weapons, and perhaps spacecraft.
- Clarifying legal interpretations of maritime laws or norms. Experience suggests that this will be more effective if there is agreement in advance on the legitimacy of the process.
- Safety protocols: A Chinese speaker was concerned that these might make it easier for U.S. ships to enter Chinese waters, contrary to Chinese policies. Chinese vessels have been allowed to sail through U.S. waters when they observed the UNCLOS procedures.
- Anti-terrorism and anti-piracy: Extending the systems that are already working in the Indian Ocean.
- Emergency Communications: Hot lines would be possible, but in the case of India and Pakistan they have been less likely to be used when relations are bad.
- Codes of Conduct: The effort to develop a code of conduct with the ASEAN countries and China has been going on for 25 years. The idea is still a good one but will only work if stakeholders are included and everyone accepts the legitimacy of the process.

Subject-Specific Cooperation: Many of the subjects on this list are global ones, widely cited as a promising area for cooperation:

- Climate change and the environment: The Conference of Parties of the U.N. climate change convention will take place in November. Preparing for and following up on similar global events would be a good way to build longer-range cooperation.
- Pandemic prevention: The key would be to sidestep the controversy over the Coronavirus origins, and to focus on those preparations that must be made after a new dangerous organism has been identified.
- Strengthening economic institutions: The World Trade Organization is having a difficult time, and agreement on making it work better would be very beneficial. This is a very ambitious effort, however.
- Humanitarian relief: India and the U.S. have experience working together; China could be included.

Border negotiations are beyond the scope of this project, but one potential idea would be to examine existing agreements between India and China to see if there are principles that can carry over to new agreements.

Both the process of cooperation and the actual work involved in any of these steps could have important benefits. In that spirit, we hope the measures discussed here will be further explored, and the list of vehicles for cooperation further expanded.

THE CHANGING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ORDER

Discussions of the post-World War II global order usually start with the rich array of institutions created as the war ended – the United Nations and affiliated agencies, international alliance systems, and the network of international economic institutions intended to help countries recover from the damage of war and to prevent the kind of economic implosion so many experienced during the Great Depression.

Our discussions, however, started from the regional order in the Indo-Pacific region. This area has no region-wide security institution. The United States has been a powerful economic and security presence in the Indo-Pacific for over seven decades now. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is a consultative mechanism composed of the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India. It is not an alliance but has become increasingly important for discussing common security concerns among its members. The global economic institutions created after World War II – GATT and later the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, regional development banks – have been the most important rule-setters in the “rules-based order,” in the Indo-Pacific as elsewhere. The membership of newly independent countries changed the shape and character of many of these institutions.

Regional organizations have become an increasingly important element in the regional order. The majority of their members are countries that were not independent at the end of World War II. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, is the most fully developed. ASEAN stops well short of binding regional norms in most cases, preferring to steer carefully around sovereignty issues. It has grown from six to ten member countries. It has formal dialogue relationships with ten non-ASEAN countries, including the U.S., China, and India. While most of ASEAN’s work is on economic issues, it also has consultative mechanisms extending to security, and some of these also include dialogue partner countries. These relationships would make ASEAN a possible framework for convening consultations on regional relationships that extend beyond its membership.

One other regional organization is important to mention: the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. APEC includes 21 member economies in East Asia and on the other side of the Pacific. Its members include the U.S. and China as well as “Chinese Taipei.” As its name suggests, APEC aims to harmonize economic policies.

China’s greater engagement with international institutions and its tremendous economic growth has already changed the system. It joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1980, and the WTO in 2001.

Today, however, there are strong pressures for more far-reaching changes to the regional order. U.S., Chinese and Indian goals diverge:

- Of the three, China arguably is the most dissatisfied with the current situation. It wants to retrieve the centrality it believes it enjoyed before the colonial period. As Chinese power grows, the differences in the interpretations of the UNCLOS as well as in the understanding

of the WTO rules between China and the US have contributed to increasingly intensified frictions and conflict between these two great powers.

- India also wants to be accepted as one of the rule-makers and has some differences with both China and the United States on navigation but does not have the same determination as China to fundamentally change the regional order.
- The United States supports the current norms, both for trade and for navigation, and wants to maintain its current dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

While all three countries consider the Indo-Pacific region to be within the ambit of their national security policy, their main focus is on different parts of the region:

- China has for some years been expanding its presence in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean. It has been creating structures designed to substantiate its claims in the South China Sea. In the one case that has been adjudicated, an international tribunal in The Hague found in favor of the Philippines, specifically rejecting China's claims to historic rights. China refused to participate in the arbitration when it was initiated by the Philippines in 2013, on the ground that China excluded maritime delimitation from compulsory arbitration in a declaration in 2006 citing Article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China then rejected the tribunal's finding as "null and void" with no binding force.⁵
- India has historically been most concerned about the Indian Ocean, but as its economic ties in Southeast and East Asia have expanded, so has its maritime presence. It proclaims to support freedom of navigation throughout these waters; however, China maintains that India's position on navigation through its Exclusive Economic Zones is more rigid than China's.
- India and China have a long land border in the high Himalayas, defined over a century ago, and the subject of thousands of miles of disputed claims. Following a serious clash in June 2020, this has become the one "hot" border involving two of these three countries.
- The United States historically had the strongest interest in Southeast Asia and further East, and to the West of the Indian Ocean. It now looks on the Indian Ocean as part of the larger region to its East, as illustrated by the change in nomenclature to the Indo-Pacific region.

In our discussion of the changing global order, speakers from all three countries observed that the long-term factors mentioned at the beginning of this report had accelerated the pace of change in the regional order. The global pandemic disrupted global supply chains as well as domestic economies. India was harder hit than either China or the U.S., but all three were affected. The shift toward a more nationalistic political environment in this region intensified the mistrust that went with these economic changes.

Our participants met at a time when Sino-Indian and U.S.-Chinese relations were both at a low point, while U.S.-India relations had been expanding and strengthening for a couple of decades. The region's ability to remain peaceful and grow economically, speakers from all three

⁵ Jane Perlez, "Tribunal Rejects China's Claims in South China Sea," *The New York Times*, July 12, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-philippines.html>; Ren Yan and Liu Xin, "South China Sea Verdict 'Null and Void' with No Binding Force: FM," *Global Times*, July 13, 2016, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/993909.shtml>.

countries agreed, depends critically on creating, or re-creating, trust among China, India, and the United States.

We will come back to that theme, especially toward the end of the report. But it is important to consider at the outset the meaning of “strategic mistrust” and “trust,” among three large countries with a history of contested interests. Our speakers did not explicitly define either term, but we offer here two suggested definitions that fit the discussion at our symposium, and that may point us toward steps to avoid conflict.

- Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, in a classic article published in 2012, define “strategic mistrust” as *the mutual distrust of long-term intentions*.
- Trust is trickier to pin down. Rather than adopt the everyday meaning of “confidence,” we suggest the definition that same study attributed to U.S. security officials: that trust exists when “a nation’s long-term plans are understood, and its actions roughly correspond to those plans.” This closely resembles the goal US President Joe Biden articulated before his June 2021 summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin: trust comes from a “stable and predictable” relationship.⁶

Trust requires countries to have enough experience working together to be able to interpret with reasonable accuracy the significance of each other’s actions and their leaders’ words, and to respond in a manner that makes a peaceful outcome more likely. In other words, trust between countries involves some common understandings about the boundaries one must observe to avoid conflict. It is a condition that countries need to create, typically by finding areas where they can work together toward limited goals, and then building on that experience. And the trust-building process requires that countries conduct themselves with respect for each other.

Speakers from all three countries underscored the potential risks of allowing mistrust to deepen. One Chinese speaker linked this to the problem of changing the prevailing norms in use in the region. He argued that unless the “old rules” and “old order” were changed to bring them in line with the international landscape, the consequences could “damage all humanity.” He warned against unilateralism or a “Cold War mentality.” Another Chinese speaker, in commenting on the “shocking state” of U.S.-China relations, stressed that they must above all avoid war. But he also observed that the “old global order” has not been adjusted to accept a rising power like China. A U.S. speaker said that Washington had given up its mental map of the U.S. as a hub connected by spokes to other countries. He stressed the urgency of consensus-building and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. One Indian speaker, acknowledging that China had its own model of how to organize modern societies, cautioned that China’s right to organize its own society did not override the rights of other countries to determine if the old rules or proposed new ones were satisfactory for them.

Looking at the current situation in the Indo-Pacific region, speakers cited a daunting list of conflicts and challenges that India, China and the United States would need to deal with. Some are conflicts, actual or potential, such as the June 2020 border clash between India and China; potential spillover from the long conflict in Afghanistan, with great uncertainty in the region following U.S. departure and the Taliban takeover; and Taiwan. Some extend beyond the India-China-U.S. triad but could affect the whole region, such as the 75-year-old problem of

⁶ *Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust*, Washington: Brookings Institution, March 2012, p. 5 and p. 30.

Kashmir, conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea, and North Korea's nuclear program. Others are regional manifestations of global issues, notably climate change, the current pandemic, and possible future ones.

Among the conflicts mentioned, the India-China border problem directly and profoundly affects these two countries' ability to build trust. Bilateral talks have been taking place for decades between the two countries. An agreement on maintaining border peace and tranquility has been in place since 1993. Following the armed clash in June 2020, India and China undertook fresh bilateral talks specifically aimed at resolving the issues it brought up. The brief discussions of this issue during our webinars gave no indication that the two countries are close to a mutually satisfactory resolution. More than one Chinese speaker emphasized the importance of "managing" the border and freezing changes in the status quo. However, it was not clear that China and India were talking about the same status quo. If building trust is a prerequisite for a stable and peaceful region, this is an important gap.

Beyond these direct clashes, there are important differences on maritime security and on economic issues, which will be discussed in greater depth in the next two sections. But the underlying problem for these issues as well as the security problems listed here is the same: managing important problems in a manner that helps countries build trust.

Speakers from all three countries noted that U.S.-China relations were at a low point, and that China-India relations had been seriously damaged by the events of June 2020. Speakers from all three also agreed that China's growing economic and military power and its perceived increasingly assertive policy were among the major challenges facing regional countries. All countries would need to engage with China and adapt to its growing power, but this would require a strenuous effort at consensus building and displaying mutual respect. The rise of China, accelerated by the COVID pandemic, has already changed the regional balance.

A speaker from India observed that U.S. military presence in the region was in tension with growing Chinese military power. He argued that three key drivers for the next few years would be how China uses its expanded power; how the U.S. responds; and India's openness to engaging with both. He cautioned that the U.S. should not have just a China policy but needed an Asia policy as well. A speaker from China stressed that as India drew closer to the United States, it must remember that "neighbors should always be friends."

One interesting point of broad agreement in principle concerned rulemaking. On navigation, trade and the South China Sea, the conditions for the Belt and Road Initiative, and by implication on the full panoply of regional norms that are now being contested, there was agreement that all affected countries "had every right" to be part of the rule-making process. But this agreement in principle is not specific about what changes would be desirable or what procedures would be agreeable to all the affected countries.

If trust is essential to avoid a disastrous conflict, and if some form of concrete cooperation is one of the most powerful ways of building it, what issues might lend themselves to India-China-U.S. cooperation? Global issues appeared to speakers from all three countries to

have the greatest potential. Climate change was cited by nearly everyone in this context. Global issues cannot be resolved by individual countries, and hence need the contribution of a group.

Health security also came up frequently as a possible focus for cooperation. Chinese speakers believed that China's experience suppressing the virus could generate useful lessons for others. The need for global collaboration to prevent future pandemics and repair the supply chain for the medications and equipment needed in global health emergencies is clear. However, the challenge would be how to avoid being sidetracked by the continuing charges and countercharges about the origins of the COV-2 virus.

The national interests and sensitivities of China, the United States and India span a remarkable array of issues. For this project, we have selected two topics for closer examination: maritime security, a preoccupation of all three countries and the focus of important divergences in their interests; and their economic interaction, which includes both powerful shared interests and energetic competition. After examining them, we will return to the underlying theme of this report: how to manage strategic mistrust among the three.

MARITIME SECURITY

Historically, rulers of China and India gave primacy to their land borders in crafting their security policy. The two countries share a long border, whose definition in the late 19th century was not always precise at the time and is now contested.⁷ Our choice of maritime security for a deeper dive reflects changes in the security perspectives of both countries. Both have become more dependent on international trade in the past half century; both have important relationships with the coastal countries near the great seas of the region; and both now see the maritime dimension as critical to their national economies and to their security.

By contrast, the U.S. engagement with the Indo-Pacific region has always had a strong maritime flavor, and the U.S. defines itself as an Asian and Pacific power on the basis of its off-shore Pacific states of Hawaii and Alaska, its territory of Guam, its Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and its security obligations in the western Pacific. The Indo-Pacific maritime security interests of the U.S., China and India extend from the Persian Gulf, through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, to the East China Sea. All three are engaged in the South China Sea. We will review the perspective of each country, as the speakers at our Webinar described them.

PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA

The Chinese speaker began by recalling that the previous U.S. administration had called China a “strategic competitor,” and noting that the Biden administration was continuing to build its policy around the Indo-Pacific framework. From China’s perspective, U.S. strategies for great power competition were intended to push back China’s economic, diplomatic, and military influence. The fundamental issue was China’s rise, and especially its rise as a maritime power. China has historically not been a maritime power, even though it has vast maritime interests. The measures China takes to safeguard territorial rights, especially in the South and East China Seas, have been described by the U.S. as “assertive.” The U.S. sees China’s Belt and Road Initiative as an effort to change the order in the region and supplant the U.S. as the dominant power in the vast Indo-Pacific region. All these factors, in China’s view, have raised tensions and created the danger of a maritime crisis or even conflict.

The same speaker argued that India’s role was changing. The U.S. “needed” India as a “straw counterbalance to China.” The speaker said that India had interests that conflict with China’s. These included the disputed border, Indian relations with Pakistan, and competition for resources, especially water. Other differences in interests included India’s Act East policy, which had implications for the South China Sea; India’s decision to host Quad naval exercises (“Malabar”) and India’s rising defense budget. India was competing with China for access to facilities in third countries such as Sri Lanka and Maldives. All this suggested that India was

⁷ An excellent description of the history of the problem is in Kyle Gardner, *The Frontier Complex: Geopolitics and the Making of the India-China Border, 1846-1962*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

now formulating its strategic policies in the Indo-Pacific context so as to have greater leverage over China and the U.S.

This list appeared to cast India's emerging relationships with the U.S., the Quad countries, and the countries of Southeast Asia as contrary to Chinese interests. The speaker did, however, note that India and China had not historically been maritime adversaries, and that the U.S. generally supported India's position on these issues. The speaker also noted that China also did not have maritime disputes with the U.S.

To reduce the risk of conflict, the speaker said, the U.S. and India must first stop stigmatizing Chinese intentions. The speaker objected in particular to accusations that China is a "rule-breaker" and a disrupter of freedom of navigation, charging that the U.S. Navy was the one that broke the rules by sailing through China's territorial waters without pre-notification. China's military footprint would increase in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. It is normal to acquire facilities, and the best way to proceed is to keep the rules. Observing the rules is a policy that benefits peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and has served China well. China takes strategic competition and different interests with India and the U.S. as givens. But the way to deal with them is in a peaceful three-way discourse.

PERSPECTIVE FROM INDIA

The speaker from India recalled that thirty years ago, when the U.S. and India were sometimes described as "estranged democracies," conferences on strategic issues (and specifically on maritime security) discussed many of the same issues that have come up at this Webinar. Since that time, the relationship between the United States and India has radically changed, but the topics under discussion have not changed much. Major power competition among India, China and the U.S. has been an abiding theme, and is likely to remain so.

Looking ahead a decade, the power relationships among these three countries are likely to change further. The speaker anticipated that by 2030 China was likely to have the largest economy, with the United States close behind and India a distant third. Policymakers in all three countries will have to balance their conflicting interests. It will be important to distinguish between threats and challenges.

He suggested looking at the maritime domain along three axes. The first was security, as the Chinese speaker had discussed. In the short to medium term, he believed the chances of sufficient "amity" to sustain a truly cooperative security dialogue were poor, but the effort was nonetheless essential. The second track was economics, especially trade and energy. (A longer discussion on this issue in the third Webinar of the series is in the next section.) There, the window for active cooperation is still open.

The third category was the link between the maritime domain and climate change and sustainability. The speaker argued forcefully that this was the most urgent, both because of the potentially disastrous effects on the world if the problem is not tackled, and because this is not a problem that can be managed solo by even a very large country.

One important reason to maintain dialogue even if the path to cooperation is difficult is that this is a way to prevent strategic misperceptions, which could also have serious consequences.

PERSPECTIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES

The speaker from the U.S. led off with a short list of key U.S. interests in the maritime domain:

- Access to Asia, including access for trade. This has been a U.S. priority since 1792.
- Strengthening alliance relationships with U.S. allies: the island states of Japan, the Philippines and Australia and the “quasi-island” of South Korea; fulfilling the requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act.
- Upholding the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), maintaining freedom of the high seas, and honoring the findings the 2016 Hague Tribunal regarding maritime rights in the South China Sea. He noted that all of China’s maritime neighbors have unresolved maritime claims disputes with Beijing.
- In the Indian Ocean, in addition to the access guaranteed by UNCLOS and the security of our ally Australia, the U.S. has an interest in helping India improve its capacity to be a security provider for the region. It also has an important interest in maintaining access to its facilities on Diego Garcia. US policy is to ensure global access to the Strait of Hormuz.

The United States is often criticized for not having ratified the UNCLOS Convention. It issued a formal public statement in 1983 undertaking to “accept and act in accordance with the balance of interests [in the Convention] relating to traditional uses of the oceans -- such as navigation and overflight.”⁸ As the U.S. speaker made clear, the U.S. upholds the norms set out in that convention as an important interest.

Next, the U.S. speaker explored the U.S. policies that followed from these interests. When the U.S. changed the name of its command to the Indo-Pacific command, it was a change of name but did not change the scope of the command’s responsibilities. He expected the U.S. to remain concerned about the active disputes in the South China Sea. Two in particular are related to the US defense treaty with the Philippines: Mischief Reef (or *Meiji jiao* in Chinese) and Scarborough Shoal (or *Huangyan dao* in Chinese).⁹ He suggested that these places have been the site of problems between the United States and China for 25 years (in the case of Mischief Reef which Beijing occupied in the mid-1990’s, despite the fact it was on the continental shelf the Philippines). Scarborough Shoal was effectively seized by Beijing in 2012 when it reneged on a diplomatic deal with Manila and Washington. The speaker noted that in the wake of this fait

⁸ The United States has not ratified UNCLOS. (Statement on United States Oceans Policy, March 10, 1983, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-united-states-oceans-policy>).

⁹ The discussion of the contested maritime claims in the South China Sea draws on Oriana Skylar Mastro, “How China is Bending the Rules in the South China Sea,” *The Interpreter*, Lowy Institute, February 17, 2021, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea>, Mischief Reef is a low-tide formation, not visible at high tide, on which China has built structures starting in 1995; Scarborough Shoal is a rock formation where China has been encamped since 2012.

accompli, US administrations, starting with Obama, have made clear that Washington would consider it a dangerous move for China to begin base- building operations there.

The speaker expected the Biden administration to continue to emphasize the Quad. He argued on a personal basis that it would make sense to invite South Korea to join the Quad. He also expected U.S. Freedom of Navigation operations (FONOPS) to continue, and said the U.S. would sail, fly, and operate “wherever international law permits.”

COMMON INTERESTS

All three speakers referred briefly to what they considered the common interests among the three countries participating in this project. Peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is the most fundamental shared interest. Accident prevention in the case of unintended contacts was another, along with keeping the sea lanes to and through the Indian Ocean open.

The speakers brought up several subjects that would lend themselves to three-way cooperation. Some had been mentioned in the first Webinar. Most had support from two or three of the participating countries. What was striking about this discussion was the degree to which participants were concerned about crisis prevention and management.

Anti-terrorism and anti-piracy: This had support from speakers from all three countries. In the Western Indian Ocean, ships of several nationalities (including China and India) have participated in counter-piracy operations for the past decade, and NATO has mounted a counter-piracy operation, Operation Ocean Shield, from 2009-2016.¹⁰ All three have participated in coordination meetings in Bahrain. This should continue.

Humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and search and rescue: The Chinese speaker mentioned this, but the history of these types of work in the Indian Ocean would suggest that they would also be feasible for the United States and India. The U.S. pulled together a “Core Group” of countries to coordinate relief efforts following the tsunami in 2004. India was part of this group, and the U.S. and Indian Navies worked together on humanitarian relief in Sri Lanka after the 2004 Tsunami. This suggests that a three-way collaboration should be feasible in this area as well.

Crisis prevention and management generated the most intense discussion in this Webinar, both among the speakers and with the other participants. The common thread running through these issues is the need both for agreement on how to prevent close contact from turning into a crisis, and for communicating should a crisis develop. This set of issues represents the most easily accessible way of preventing a potential war from arising out of the day-by-day activities of vessels in the region’s waters.

¹⁰ See <https://mc.nato.int/missions/operation-ocean-shield>, Website of Allied Maritime Command; see also Olivia Gippner, “Antipiracy and Unusual Coalitions in the Indian Ocean Region: China’s Changing Role and Confidence Building with India,” *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, December 1, 2016, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/186810261604500304>.

This part of the discussion highlighted starkly the dangers of allowing the current situation to drift, with China-India and China-U.S. relations in bad shape and communications between these countries thin. We will return, in later parts of this report, to one of the most dangerous features of the current situation: the risk of strategic misperception. The final section of the report includes an extended list of potential crisis management and prevention measures. This situation makes regular dialogue even more important. Policymakers in all three countries need to have a clear understanding of how their counterparts think, and how they have put together their strategic vision.

The most important objective here is to avoid a war that, it is quite clear, none of the three countries wants. That should go without saying – but it is important to make this explicit, to remind ourselves that this goal will not be achieved automatically. It requires the effort, imagination, and judgment of people from all three countries.

THE NEW GEO-ECONOMICS OF ASIA

The Indo-Pacific region is the crossroads of some of the world's liveliest economies, but its importance to the global well-being has risen sharply. From the perspective of the three countries in this report, China and the United States are India's two biggest trading partners; and China and the United States are each other's largest trading partners. Add to this the tremendous increase in this region's share of the world GDP, and the importance of the economic interactions that take place in and through the region becomes clear.

The discussion of maritime security was dominated by discordant interests among China, India, and the United States. By contrast, although the theme of competition figured prominently in the discussion of geo-economics, there was an underlying recognition that taking advantage of the economic strength of the region could benefit all three countries. This was evident right from the start, when one of the Chinese speakers spoke about the importance of "benign" competition, in which countries do not regard competitors as "evil," and all use "decent means." He cautioned that focusing entirely on self-reliance would eliminate the benefits of globalization, which had already made the world safer and more equitable. "Decoupling" countries that had become interdependent would carry a heavy cost.

PERSPECTIVE FROM INDIA

The Indian speaker led off with a discussion of the epochal changes under way in the global distribution of economic production. Since the turn of the century, the combined GDP of the G-7 countries has fallen from 44 percent to 25-30 percent of global output. In those same twenty years, the BRICS countries'¹¹ combined GDP rose from under 20 percent of global GDP to almost 35 percent – a larger percentage than the G-7. Developing countries' total GDP is now larger than the combined GDP of all industrialized countries.

The world is struggling to adapt to this rapid change. The last time the world faced a similar pace of change was a little over 100 years ago, starting in the early industrial age before the beginning of World War I. The shift from U.K. to U.S. dominance was messy and included two world wars and the Great Depression. The world needs benign cooperation to avoid going down a similar path again.

Asia is becoming the center of gravity for the world economy. Asian combined GDP is greater than that of the U.S., but per capita GDP in the U.S. is higher than the average for Asia, and U.S. military power is greater than the combined military power of Asia. Going forward, we can expect that the U.S. will continue to lead in science, but China is fast catching up. The Asian financial sector at present is relatively weak.

This will be an uneasy transition. The Quad is part of the U.S. effort to maintain its influence in the Indo-Pacific region. So far, it deals only with security issues, but it is possible that at some point it will expand its discussions into new areas and/or draw in new members.

¹¹ Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

The pandemic has generated efforts to close borders. India should not rely on this tactic. Openness has served India well in the past thirty years. The world is also trying to keep China out of some emerging technological fields, witness the attempts to freeze Huawei out of several important markets. This is also unlikely to work. All these developments are the result of natural tensions resulting from the underlying economic change.

The United States may be focusing too much on China, and not enough on Asia as a whole. Asia is developing a dense network of regional institutions, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the ASEAN dialogues. India's decision to back out of RCEP negotiations was ill-advised. India has started building a web of agreements, including trade agreements with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, but needs to do more to build bridges with the rest of Asia.

Global economic governance has eroded in the past 4-5 years. It needs more attention. The economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the international development banks, and the World Trade Organization, need to reorganize and update their voting systems to give Asian countries a greater voice, or the institutions will continue to decline. The speaker expressed admiration for the speed with which US President Biden had attacked domestic problems in the U.S. but regretted that he had not yet applied the same effort to global governance.

PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA

The Chinese speaker focused primarily on Sino-Indian relations. Both countries, he said, favored "world de-polarization." They are the world's two largest developing countries, so they need to work together to advance the needs of developing countries. The Chinese and Indian economies, he said, are highly complementary, and their trade is rising. Chinese companies are setting up production in India. China and India together account for 35% of the world population.

The speaker made a plea for safeguarding the free trade system and reforming economic institutions. He argued that this was a cause which India and China should jointly promote. The BRICS organization provided a good forum for cooperative work involving China and India.

The speaker argued that environmental protection should be a promising area for cooperation between China and India, including specifically protecting the fragile Himalayan environment.

The China-India border dispute, he said, is not the full picture of India-China relations. It cannot easily be resolved in the short term, but China insists on solving the problem through dialogue and consultation to ease tensions. China-India cooperation can benefit the people of both countries and contribute to the "century of Asia."

PERSPECTIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES

The U.S. speaker emphasized five key points. First, economic patterns have been changing since before the pandemic. After the global financial crisis of 2008, GDP began to grow faster than trade. Production and trade in services are growing faster than goods. An example of the potential of new technologies is 3D printing, which has shifted production from large, uniform production runs to customized production. Regional trade patterns have shifted as well in products such as auto parts, electronic components, and computers. These changes, he said, have been especially apparent in Asia. China has increased domestic demand, built its internal supply chains, and begun to climb up the technology ladder. And even before the pandemic, governments were lagging in adapting trade rules and standards to fit these changes.

Second, after a year of COVID, technological change has accelerated. Examples include blockchain, artificial intelligence, and cross-border and digital services. These changes represent a shift toward greater resilience and better risk management in supply chains. These changes also contribute to rising trade. More digital services are becoming tradable, such as health, education, and entertainment. One result will be the greater importance of adapting rules for digital transfers. As the West recovers, commodity prices are rising. There is growing demand for sustainable practices.

Third, the international trade system is in trouble. The U.S. led in creating the world trade system, and China relied on that system in its rapid growth. However, ironically, both countries have undermined the system. Obama grew tired of endless trade disputes; Trump shifted to managed trade; China has used trade as a weapon to punish other countries. The EU has developed elaborate regulations, such as those for data, which are widely used but not universally adopted. They therefore serve as something of a barrier to smooth international business.

His fourth point concerned the Chinese policy of “dual circulation,” an effort to make China’s growth arise out of its enormous internal market (“internal circulation”) while simultaneously maintaining a rapidly expanding export sector (“external circulation”). Accomplishing both these goals at the same time will have both internal and external consequences. China’s latest Five-Year Plan emphasizes the strong security dimension in the way China looks at trade. Now, China’s concept of political security includes extraterritorial application of Chinese law. China has also maintained an important structural agenda, including quality of life, technology, and the role of state-owned enterprises. China’s Belt and Road initiative points towards a long-term direction for Chinese policy. Its decision in mid-September to apply for membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)¹² is an even stronger signal. China is likely to proceed on two tracks: it will work within the existing trade system, but the Belt and Road Initiative will enfold regional countries into a latter-day “tributary state” system. This is evolving into something like “globalization with Chinese characteristics.” China looks at the long-term struggle in Marxist/Leninist terms but is tactical in the short term.

Fifth: the speaker noted some elements of continuity between President Biden’s policies and those of the Trump administration. Biden’s top priorities are COVID and economic

¹² After former President Trump pulled out of the Transpacific Partnership, the remaining members renegotiated and formed the CPTPP. It is this successor organization that China applied to join.

recovery. These are at the heart of his domestic agenda. His other priorities also have an important domestic impact: climate change, vaccines and biological security, and immigration.

President Biden appears to be keeping many of the Trump tariffs at least for bargaining purposes. He has an important international agenda – particularly rebuilding U.S. alliances and coalitions. Trade is the missing piece of his multilateral agenda, however. Biden will keep his distance from the CPTPP. Secretary of State Blinken has adopted a three-part model for managing relations with China: cooperating where possible, competing in cutting-edge industries, and confronting where the U.S. believes China has overstepped. Many U.S. foreign policy experts are looking for an “off-ramp” from today’s difficult U.S.-China relations.

Summing up, the speaker said that US policymakers have not yet recognized the scope of the Indo-Pacific region’s transformation. Asian countries, on the other hand, have difficulty distinguishing between government policy and the greater adaptability of the private sector. Since the pandemic started, the pace of business has accelerated. Business will persevere with India. Two key factors going forward, both of them potential areas for cooperation, are climate change and biological and health security.

THE PANDEMIC

The Indian speaker spoke briefly about the second wave of the pandemic, which was taking a terrible toll on India at the time of the Webinar. As a measure of the scale of the disaster, he commented that 14 out of the 38 staff of his think tank in Delhi were ill with COVID. On the other hand, it was striking how low case rates had been in Asia east of Bangladesh; perhaps these countries could offer some lessons to the rest of the world.

The Chinese speaker expressed distress at the suffering the pandemic had caused in India. He described the ways in which the Chinese government had helped India in dealing with the pandemic, by increasing production and supply to India of key products and by providing help in transporting these products to India. In particular, China provided over 5,000 ventilators and over 21,000 oxygen concentrators. China had offered to work together in organizing conferences of COVID experts. The speaker stressed the importance of working together to conquer the pandemic.

The U.S. speaker reflected on the importance of the pandemic as an accelerator of economic change. He urged that biosecurity become a focus area for cooperative work among the three countries.

DISCUSSION OF TRADE POLICY

Two questions from Indian webinar participants brought up the question of how to achieve self-reliance, a long-standing goal of Indian economic policy makers. The Indian speaker responded that India’s economic policy was turning inward, relying on self-reliance and selective subsidies. The current overvalued Indian rupee has made the Indian economy less competitive, leading to private sector demands for protection. The speaker expressed the hope that as COVID ebbs, India would rethink its economic strategy and open up again. A U.S. speaker,

acknowledging that “make at home” is the political reality in many countries, suggested that the goal for trade should be to focus on the resilience of supply chains rather than simply on bringing production home. Diversity of supply may be able to protect self-reliance better than just making products at home. And the Indian speaker observed that self-reliance can also mean weaning a country from foreign aid. India has largely achieved this goal: aid resource transfers are no longer a big factor in the economy. Openness has made India more self-reliant than it was before 1990.

In response to a question about the future of U.S. trade sanctions on China, a U.S. speaker said he did not expect much change in the current patterns. He expected the Biden administration to be less protectionist than the Trump administration and thought it would resolve some disputes. But the Democratic party’s politics are more supportive of trade barriers. The new U.S. Trade Representative has said that she does not want to give up the leverage of sanctions against China. She will be looking for “win-win” possibilities.

Another U.S. speaker observed that many investors are in India mainly because they want to sell into the Indian market, rather than to create a platform for exports. However, the Indian business climate is improving, and could be primed for a growth spurt post-COVID. U.S.-China competition and global trends may create opportunities for India, and investors may look on it as a viable location for investment to diversify supply chain risk.

FUTURE COOPERATION: INSTITUTIONS AND SUBJECTS

As in previous Webinars, participants from all three countries favored trying to develop cooperation on environmental issues and climate change. At present, there is broad agreement that the subjects are important but little agreement on the details of what needs to be done or how to pay for it.

The Indo-Pacific region has, as noted earlier in this report, a wealth of regional organizations. ASEAN’s pattern of consultative arrangements provides a good model. This may make it a useful convener of cooperative efforts.

MANAGING STRATEGIC MISTRUST

The final Webinar returned to the themes of regional order and strategic mistrust with which we started. The opening speaker, from the U.S., recalled the classic article by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi on U.S.-China strategic distrust, and observed that when it was written in 2012, Chinese distrust exceeded that of the U.S. This situation has now been reversed. Both sides have recognized this as a problem. She reflected on what we had learned so far:

- Strategic distrust has risen. U.S.-China relations are at a low point.
- Official U.S.-China communication seems to have been largely cut off. This creates increased risk of an accident.
 - China tended to overreach and misunderstand how different parts of the U.S. system relate to one another.
 - The U.S. had a weak understanding of China's security concerns.
- China-India relations are also at a low point. This relationship is also plagued with strategic mistrust.
- Crisis management came up in all three previous webinars.
- However, there was less discussion of how to build trust.

Against this background, the speakers gave their perspectives on how to avoid the clear dangers in this situation and identify areas for cooperation.

PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA

A Chinese speaker observed that the world had changed profoundly. Major country imbalances of power, a spreading pandemic, and evolving science and technology have changed people's lifestyle. Globalization and anti-globalization waves have changed the content of global relationships. This could lead to vicious competition. China's relations with the US and with India are in trouble. The three countries have different strategic objectives, and not enough communication.

China and the U.S., he said, are the two most important countries in the world. Both are permanent members of the Security Council. Both are big economies; both will shape the "new order." The Trump administration's National Security Statement made a fundamental change in US policy by calling China the "major competitor" of the United States.

Biden's election opened a window for improving relations, but his administration continued the tough policy it inherited from Trump. This has been reflected in statements from both U.S. political parties and in legislation considered in Congress. By now the window of opportunity has closed, and US-China relations are the greatest international challenge in the 21st Century. We are seeing strategic competition in the form of decoupling, efforts at containment in geo-politics and the military, and ideological demonization.

China and India are both big countries with over 1 billion population and huge influence in Asia. China and India are important to each other. They have policy differences in the Indian Ocean and South Asia. We also have important disagreements over India's interest in joining the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and over the Belt and Road initiative. The clashes in Doklam and Galwan have also intensified mistrust.

To avoid dangerous misunderstandings, each side needs a correct understanding of the other's strategic intentions. India and the U.S. both view China with distrust. They misunderstand China's strategic intentions. China understands that there is anxiety in the U.S. over Chinese intentions and how China will use its increased economic power to challenge the dominant position the U.S. has held for over a century, especially since World War II. Neither the U.S. nor India believes China can rise peacefully.

China believes in peaceful development and win-win solutions. We need a peaceful environment. That is the only way for China to become a global power and realize its dream. We see dangerous signs from the U.S. which suggest that they may try to strategically strangle China. This would cause a backlash. We need to put a cage around strategic competition and avoid zero-sum games.

Both the U.S. and India are Asia-Pacific countries and have a role to play. No one is seeking to exclude either one. They should be peacemakers, promoting a peaceful environment and economic progress in the region. The U.S. has some military alliances, some formal and some informal. One cannot gain the security of one state at the expense of the security of another. What kind of security arrangements do we need in this region? Asia is complex, and one must look hard at this complexity before answering that question. China is a force for peace, promotion of free trade, free investment, and a big market. We will do our best to be tolerant and not to fall into the trap of a clash of civilizations.

Beyond these two bilateral relationships, there are other informal groupings in the region. "Quasi alliances" against China include the U.S. and the U.K., and the Quad. These groups are based on a misunderstanding of China's policy. China believes that competition and cooperation are both norms of international relations, as long as one avoids vicious competition. There is still space for cooperation between China and both India and the U.S. China does not have a military alliance with Pakistan. It does not object to India's closer relationship with the U.S. as long as it does not lead to a military alliance against China. The Quad, however, clearly has China as its target. It will not be a stabilizing factor.

This webinar took place before the September 17 announcement that Australia would be procuring nuclear-powered submarines from the U.S., as part of a three-way understanding with the U.K. China reacted angrily, evidently seeing this as the latest example of a quasi-alliance against China.

PERSPECTIVE FROM INDIA

The Indian speaker focused on two questions: Why has mistrust increased? And what can be done about it?

India-China relations have been in crisis since the June 2020 clashes. These led to the first deaths in border action in 45 years. India is attempting a reset. China has already changed the status quo by patrolling across the LAC and other actions. The rise in mistrust has built up over several years.

- India also sees other signs of a clash of interests.
- China's involvement has become deeper and more aggressive in India's neighborhood.
- Its engagement in Pakistan has expanded and also become more threatening.
- Most fundamentally, China is the only great power that is unhappy with India's rise.

The speaker noted that India's Chinese friends explain their mistrust by citing India's closeness to the U.S., as well as some other factors:

- Economic growth in the 1990s has caused the two countries to bump up against one another.
- Similarly, the two countries have conflicting interests in the periphery that they share.
- India was sending more of its expanding trade through the South China Sea at the same time that it was expanding ties with the U.S.
- China's territorial claims in the South China Sea clash with India's increasing need for freedom of navigation.
- The U.S. and India have come closer together on cybersecurity and maritime security.
- COVID has enhanced U.S.-India cooperation but has fed Indian suspicion of China.

India's relations with the U.S. have gone from strength to strength and are better than ever. If there is mistrust with the U.S., it would be because of U.S. unpredictability. Will there be another Trumpian president?

The pandemic diminished all the great powers. They have all turned inward. The center of gravity of the world economy is in Asia. The speaker said he was sometimes asked if U.S.-China mistrust is good or bad for India. On balance, it complicates the essential job India needs to do of transforming itself. And in all three of the countries this report discusses, ideology gets in the way of their understanding each other.

The U.S. is also important to India for reasons other than China. Increasingly, China seems to believe that third-party relationships – e.g., the U.S. and India – will inevitably influence those countries' relations with China.

What to do? The conventional answer is to "seek strategic stability." The speaker argued that this makes no sense in today's world. Things are changing too fast. In any case "stability" sounds like continuing a status quo which is unattractive to a number of countries. It sounds hostile to development. The real answer is to manage change. We are already between international and regional orders, and all powers are at least to some degree revisionist.

The Indian speaker said he was not optimistic that there would be an outbreak of trust any time soon. However, if each country could trust the others to follow their enlightened self-

interest and to define self-interest in terms that make cooperation possible, that would help. This will ultimately depend on our internal politics. He added that depending on internal politics “makes me nervous.”

PERSPECTIVE FROM THE UNITED STATES

A U.S. speaker argued that the core of today’s mistrust comes from the collision of different countries’ geopolitical objectives. These are primarily structural factors, although accidental ones can be important as well.

China has achieved remarkable economic success. For China, this represents an asset to leverage in its effort to restore the geopolitical standing it aspires to. This is understandable. The United States had similar expectations in the late 19th century. However, this goal brings China’s achievements and ambitions into collision with others.

The speaker argued that Chinese actions seem to imply that China will insist on restrictions on their neighbors’ freedom of action. If you look at China’s neighbors, you find one instance after another, in a great arc from South Korea to South Asia, in which China used its economic power to compel others to bend to its desires. In South Korea, China used economic sanctions to force South Korea not to deploy THAAD interceptor missiles. Japan found its access to rare earths from China threatened over a dispute about offshore islands. In the South China Sea, Chinese artificial island constructions have both violated Southeast Asian countries’ sovereignty and rejected an adverse ruling from an international tribunal. Australia has faced economic and political pressure. The previous speaker laid out India’s grievances. China’s actions, in each case, reinforce the mistrust generated by its apparent objectives.

The U.S. has a long-standing objective of not wanting a hegemon on the Eurasian landmass. This goes back well before Obama or Trump. It is the geopolitical situation that best serves U.S. interests. This also serves the interests of countries on China’s periphery. The U.S. has not had to make huge efforts to win friends for this view. This is not a convergence the U.S. created, it is a logical outgrowth of the underlying dynamics – economics, politics, and geography.

Another way of looking at these underlying tectonics is to look at the three colliding sets of objectives. China seeks to recover its centrality; other Asian countries seek to preserve their autonomy; and the US aims to create “robust multipolarity” in Asia and prevent Chinese domination in ways that are hostile to U.S. interests. It is the intersection of these objectives that creates strategic mistrust.

The mistrust, in other words, is built into the structure of the region. It will be hard to change, and the conflicting objectives will not easily be resolved. The U.S. will continue to seek to keep American primacy in a “multipolar” Asia, and China’s Asian neighbors will continue to defend their freedom of choice. China will continue to seek to shape an environment favorable to its interests.

We will not be able to transform this situation in any meaningful way. There are tools for managing it. Dialogue can help, the more intense the better. Interdependence can blunt the intensity of the mistrust, up to a point. Countries will certainly expect to use their economic power and relationships as leverage, and China is not immune to this.

In these circumstances, the overriding objective must be management so as to prevent a catastrophic war. Prevention of conflict requires maintaining a balance of power favorable to U.S. and broader Asian interests. This is the key U.S. objective now, and is likely to remain so for many years, barring fundamental internal changes in the U.S.

The Indian speaker responded with one point of disagreement. China, he argued, did not have hundreds of years of centrality, though this is widely believed in China. What it really had was a series of “multi-verses,” smaller systems with more limited numbers of countries, rather than a single China-centric system. However, the precise historical accuracy is immaterial. National sentiment can be powerfully swayed by widely accepted narratives.

The U.S. speaker added that influence expands as a function of a state’s capacity. Expanded influence is therefore the natural result of China’s economic power, which is now orders of magnitude greater than in past centuries. Examples include China’s footprint in Latin America, Africa, and Europe. New forms of Chinese power will limit others’ freedom of action. If China achieves its objectives as we now perceive them this is likely to mean that other Asian countries accept some degree of deference to China.

DISCUSSION

Third country relations: The U.S. speaker noted that third country relations should not have any impact on a healthy bilateral relationship. However, in a contest for power – which is clearly the case in this triangular relationship – third country relationships will generate suspicion. China sees the U.S.-India relationship as part of an unspoken policy of containment of China. Others will not be able to change that perception.

The Indian speaker observed that all three countries had become more ideological, and hence less understanding of each other. He wondered what the Quad had really done to worry China. Maritime security, producing public goods and resilient supply chains should all be benefits for China. But its existence still concerns China and feeds this perception that the U.S. aims at “containment.”

The Chinese speaker demurred, saying that he believed China had no objection to closer U.S.-Indian ties as long as these did not lead to a military alliance against China. The Quad, he said, would not be a stabilizing influence. He also noted that a number of countries in the region found China an essential economic partner, but nonetheless relied on the U.S. for security assistance or for hedging against China. This dichotomy, he said, could not go on forever. The Chinese speaker did not spell out in detail what this meant, but suggested that some in China argued that it should try to use the influence it gained from its powerful economic relationships to limit Asian countries’ security relationships with the U.S.

Are current tensions a clash of interests or the result of mismanagement or misperceptions? The U.S. speaker noted that the region did not have problems of the current level of intensity during the Deng Xiaoping period, but China's attitude has changed in recent years. China expects that its success and accumulation of power will expand its influence. China has become more determined to force outcomes that are conducive to its own interests, throwing its weight around if necessary. However, this leads to reactions by neighbors and by the U.S.

Border tensions: The Indian speaker observed that border problems have been part of the India-China relationship for decades. June 2020 changed everything. The border is live today. That crisis is continuing.

An Indian participant, noting that conveying peaceful intentions requires actions more than words, asked whether China would withdraw its troops from the border areas where the June 2020 clashes with India took place. The Chinese speaker responded that China and India had agreed that their border dispute needed to be settled by negotiations, and that pending a resolution, neither side should take any action that changes the status quo. He said that any talk of "withdrawal" must be put in this context. This speaker did not address the fact that the Indian and Chinese speakers appeared to have different definitions of the "status quo."

Reconciling U.S. military preponderance in Asia and China's deep sense of centrality: The U.S. speaker saw this as a big challenge. The U.S. desire for effective and unfettered power projection in the region will not sit nicely with China, though it is essential if Washington is to effectively defend its Asian allies. Taiwan is the most important potential flashpoint for the U.S. and China, the place where power projection and centrality are directly opposed. To avoid a disastrous war, we need to open lines of communication in multiple dimensions – political, military, evolving trade rules, and more. This would involve intense diplomatic engagement. Avoiding a U.S.-China war will be a tremendous achievement.

The Indian speaker recommended managing the problem by breaking it down into manageable parts and working toward security that is good for all. One important common interest is maritime security.

RECOMMENDATIONS

During the six months between this project’s first Webinar and the fourth one, a sense of urgency grew about the importance of avoiding a drift towards actively hostile relations. China and India have both had decades of remarkable economic success. Both, but especially India, are suffering from the effects of the pandemic. Chinese speakers as well as observers from other countries spoke of China “achieving its dream,” and reviving the centrality that it considers its due in Asia. India too is pursuing a dream and has found the clashes along the Line of Actual Control with China deeply unsettling. The U.S. is eager to restore some degree of comity in global relations, but even U.S. President Biden, an internationalist, sees China as his country’s main geopolitical and economic competitor. The strategic mistrust that was noted at the start and discussed in detail in the final session has not abated.

Most of the Chinese speakers commented that their country’s intentions were misunderstood, and that correcting these misperceptions was the first step toward addressing strategic mistrust. It is clear both from comments at these Webinars and from other sources that misunderstandings exist in China as well. To some degree, however, these misperceptions represent the difference between what one party says and what another party hears, filtered through a different history or culture.

The size of the three countries’ commercial relationships represents an important contact point, both an arena for competition and a mutual benefit. The discussion of geoeconomics in the third Webinar proceeded on the apparent assumption that trade and investment would continue to increase. That would indeed be good news – but would not solve the problem of mistrust, because all three countries’ economic and security concerns have become thoroughly intertwined. Increasing trade creates some common interest, but by itself it will not solve the problem.

Against the background of this sobering discussion, the speakers and other participants have put on the table a rich array of actions that might help equip leaders in all three countries to create a stronger foundation for a peaceful future. They fall into three broad categories: dialogue, accident prevention, and subject-specific cooperation.

DIALOGUE

None of the participants in this project believed that dialogue alone would fundamentally change the mistrust we observed, but there was at least an implicit consensus that dialogue was an essential ingredient. The experience of the U.S.-China talks in Alaska in May 2021 suggests that the process of preparing for dialogue is as important as the actual conversation. Similarly, signaling through protocol and other aspects of the stage setting can be critical – for good or ill. These three countries have different customs for protocol and public communication that sometimes amplify misunderstanding. But developing regular channels for exchanges of views, with some continuity in who the participants are, will be vital. Security, economics, and long-term issues should all find a home in some form of dialogue.

Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi have in the past established quiet strategic discussions in which those in leadership positions can discuss how they view different regions and the global scene. They can work toward a combination of mutual deterrence, competition, and cooperation. They can establish guardrails and ground rules that will reduce the risk that mistrust will degenerate into hostility. This kind of dialogue is most urgently needed when relations are troubled. At such times, however, it is very difficult to get serious strategic communication started. The key task for national leaders is to look for moments of potential change when they can establish the kind of discreet discussions that can change the dynamic.

But even at a time that seems unpromising for a major breakthrough, identifying a topic that is more concrete, and that lends itself to a measurable outcome, can be a useful starting point. Besides being valuable in their own right, the topics listed below could also serve as entry points to a broader dialogue.

ACCIDENT PREVENTION

Dialogue can be discursive and open-ended; the accident prevention measures we recommend are concrete and specific. The items listed below all respond to dangers that project participants who have served in government have experienced or come uncomfortably close to. Several of the measures on this list have been implemented between countries who had an adversarial relationship, recognizing that they shared a strong interest in preventing unintended escalation. There are undoubtedly more examples. This list includes measures that have been brought up in the context of the Indo-Pacific.

- Informal operating protocols: During the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet naval vessels and aircraft had a standard, mutually understood way of responding when the other country's aircraft came too close to an aircraft carrier: aircraft took off from the carrier and positioned themselves off the wing of the incoming aircraft. The fact that this procedure was understood by both sides made it a valuable crisis prevention measure.
- Developing similar protocols for submarines or spacecraft: This could be the next iteration of this type of deconfliction. One participant also said that it was important to extend accident prevention to unmanned weapons, especially at a time when drones are in increasingly common use.
- Clarifying interpretations of UNCLOS or other maritime legal issues. A Chinese speaker suggested consultations among lawyers to reach consensus, or at least an understanding of the other side's position. This could be a useful mechanism, but the most recent example, the 2016 adjudication of China's South China Sea claims in the International Court of Arbitration, did not reach agreement.¹³ To use this kind of mechanism as a building block for cooperation, therefore, it would be essential to have a prior understanding that the participants would accept the legitimacy of the process.

¹³ The court in The Hague assembled an international team of skilled experts in maritime law, which explored many of the ambiguous articles in UNCLOS and issued clarifying findings. China opted not to participate, and publicly objected to the whole process on the grounds that it had a sovereign right to choose its preferred method of dispute resolution. A more complete explanation of the Chinese is in Fu Ying, "Why China says No to the Arbitration on the South China Sea," *Foreign Policy*, July 12, 2016. The author is a former Chinese Vice Minister for foreign affairs.

- Do safety protocols bring a new risk? A Chinese speaker commented that developing this type of unofficial protocol could have a result that China would not welcome. It might encourage the U.S. Navy to sail even more frequently through Chinese waters. The speaker suggested that perhaps another response could be that China would adopt the U.S. practice of sailing warships through other countries' territorial waters. It is worth noting that the US has not objected when Chinese warships have sailed through US territorial seas because the PLA Navy followed the rules outlined in UNCLOS.
- Emergency communications mechanisms: A Chinese speaker noted that India and China had agreed to set up a hot line, and that the U.S. and China had done crisis management exercises. The speaker suggested that some of these efforts could bring in all three countries. International experience with hot lines has been uneven. India and Pakistan have established them. However, these communications channels have been hard to sustain when relations deteriorated. It would be useful to design them so as to minimize this risk.
- Anti-terrorism and anti-piracy: Mechanisms and protocols exist in the Indian Ocean. Extending those into the South China Sea could be beneficial.
- Codes of Conduct: ASEAN and China committed themselves almost 25 years ago to develop a code of conduct for the South China Sea, but it is still not complete. All three countries, China, the US, India, as well as the ASEAN members, have a stake in the rules that could emerge, and would need to be participants in any revision process. Speakers at our Webinars said on several occasions that all those who would be bound by a new set of norms would need to be included in writing them. This would be an extraordinarily difficult undertaking but could yield great benefits for all the countries whose economies depend on passage through these waters.

SUBJECT-SPECIFIC COOPERATION

Like the previous category, these suggestions are concrete. They also potentially involve far more countries, but they are all topics important to India, the U.S. and China, and cooperation and consultation among these countries could make it easier to cooperate on a larger scale.

- Climate Change and the Environment: Climate change came up during each of our Webinars as a high priority for cooperation. Because the dangers are relatively long term, it is not easy to sustain the political consensus to work on these issues, but recent events in all three participating countries makes it clear that serious consequences are already showing up. The Conference of Parties took place in November in Glasgow. Following up on this and similar global events would be a good way to build longer-range cooperation.
- Pandemic prevention: The politics of this issue are toxic at the moment because of the dispute over the origins of the COVID coronavirus. However, those who have been through the current pandemic are all painfully conscious that without much better preparation and international cooperation, the same thing could happen again. If one could start the planning from the point where a new pathogen has been identified – without asking the cooperative group to try to identify where or how – and trace the needed preparation process from that point on, one could still make a strong contribution to global health. Again, this would normally be a global effort, but India, China and the

United States all have a wealth of scientists and would benefit by discussions among them. There is a long history of cooperation between U.S. and Indian scientists on infectious disease. Smallpox and polio eradication are two examples, which were deeply controversial at the start, but were ultimately successful when the scientists carrying out the projects changed their procedures to provide for much greater local buy-in and responsibility.¹⁴ This experience has yielded important lessons for future efforts.

- Strengthening economic institutions: The World Trade Organization, as noted elsewhere in this report, is in trouble, and all three of the countries we are discussing have contributed to that situation. In particular, the dispute settlement mechanism has practically stopped working. This is a contentious issue among the U.S., China, and India, but it would be worth exploring whether a “track two” process that went outside the usual government channels could create some ideas to guide a revitalization of the trade system. This would be extremely difficult, because all three countries have turned inward since the pandemic broke out, but the benefits of a better functioning trade system would be huge.
- Humanitarian relief: The United States and India have cooperated on a number of humanitarian relief missions, notably after the 2004 Tsunami. Working with China on a future disaster could build experience cooperating.

NOTE ON BORDER ISSUES

India and China established a dialogue in the hope of resolving the issues connected with the clashes between India and China in the summer of 2020. The border has been the subject of disagreement for many decades and was the scene of a war in 1962. In the past three decades, India and China have had a series of high-level dialogues, and have concluded at least five agreements, starting with the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control, and continuing with others aimed at implementing this agreement, establishing confidence building measures, and establishing principles for dealing with the border.

Mapping out a resolution of these problems goes well beyond the scope of this project. One suggestion that arose from our discussions, however, was to examine all these agreements and identify principles that might guide the search for a successful settlement.

Both the process of cooperation and the actual work involved in any of these steps could have important benefits. The process and dialogue involved would provide the participating countries with an opportunity to understand better how their opposite numbers think and work. And the problems we suggest addressing are important ones in creating a stable and peaceful future. In that spirit, we hope the measures discussed here will be further explored, and the list of vehicles for cooperation further expanded.

¹⁴ Teresita C. Schaffer, “Polio Eradication in India: Getting to the Verge of Victory – and Beyond?”, Washington: CSIS Global Health Policy Center, January 2012.

APPENDIX I: LIST OF SPEAKERS (ALPHABETICAL)

Bhaskar, C. Uday (Commodore)

Director, Society for Policy Studies; Retired Military Officer in the Indian Navy; Former Officiating Director, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; Former Director, National Maritime Foundation

乌代·巴斯卡尔，印度海军退役准将、政策研究学会（SPS）主任；Manohar Parrikar 国防研究与分析研究所前任主任；印度国家海事基金会前主任

Bloch, Julia Chang (Ambassador)

President, US-China Education Trust

张之香大使，中美教育基金会主任

He, Yafei (Minister)

Former Vice Minister, China Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Former Deputy Director, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council; Former Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations - Geneva Office

何亚非部长，中国外交部前副部长；国务院侨务办公室原副主任；中国前联合国大使-日内瓦办事处

Jaishankar, Dhruva

Observer Research Foundation U.S. Representative

印度观察家研究基金会美国代表

Jia, Qingguo

Director of Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding and former Dean of the School of International Studies, Peking University.

贾庆国，北京大学中外人文交流研究基地主任，北京大学国际关系学院原院长

Ma, Zhengang (Ambassador)

Former Chinese Ambassador to the United Kingdom, former Deputy Director of Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

马振岗大使，前中国驻英国大使，国务院外事办公室原副主任

McDevitt, Michael (Rear Admiral)

Senior Fellow and Former Vice President, CNA; Former Commandant of the National War College; Former Director of East Asia Policy Office for the Secretary of Defense.

麦德伟，美国海军前少将；CNA 高级研究员兼前副总裁；国家战争学院前指挥官；国防部长前东亚政策办公室主任

Menon, Shivshankar (Ambassador)

Former Foreign Secretary of India; Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister; Former Indian Ambassador to China and Israel & Former High Commissioner to Pakistan and Sri Lanka

湿婆勋爵·梅农大使，印度前外交大臣；前总理国家安全顾问；前印度驻中国和以色列大使，前巴基斯坦和斯里兰卡高级专员

Mohan, C. Raja

Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Founding Director of Carnegie India

拉加·莫汉教授，新加坡国立大学南亚研究所所长，卡耐基印度基金会创始理事

Mohan, Rakesh

President, Centre for Social and Economic Progress; former Senior Fellow, Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University; former Executive Director, International Monetary Fund

拉克什·莫汉博士，社会和经济进步中心主席；耶鲁大学杰克逊全球事务研究所前高级研究员；国际货币基金组织前执行董事

Pickering, Thomas (Ambassador)

Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, the Russian Federation, India, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan, and holds the personal rank of Career Ambassador

托马斯·皮克林大使，前美国副国务卿（负责政治事务），前美国驻联合国、俄罗斯联邦、印度、以色列、萨尔瓦多、尼日利亚和约旦大使

Platt, Nicholas (Ambassador)

Chairman, US-China Education Trust; former US Ambassador to Zambia, the Philippines, and Pakistan; former President of Asia Society

尼古拉斯·普拉特大使，美中教育信托基金主席；前美国驻赞比亚、菲律宾和巴基斯坦大使；前亚洲协会主席

Qi, Haotian

Secretary General, Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding, Peking University

祁昊天，北京大学中外人文交流研究基地秘书长；北京大学国际关系学院助理教授

Schaffer, Teresita (Ambassador)

Former US Ambassador to Sri Lanka; Senior Advisor, McLarty Associates; Special Advisor, US-China Education Trust.

特雷西塔·沙弗大使，前美国驻斯里兰卡大使；McLarty Associates 高级顾问；中美教育基金会特别顾问

Stratford, Timothy

Chairman Emeritus, American Chamber of Commerce in China; Managing Partner, Covington & Burling LLP Beijing Office

夏尊恩，中国美国商会名誉主席；科文顿-伯林律师事务所北京办事处管理合伙人

Tellis, Ashley

Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Strategic Planning and Southwest Asia, National Security Council; Former Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs

阿什利·泰利斯，卡内基国际和平基金会战略事务主席兼高级研究员；国家安全委员会前总统特别助理兼战略规划和西南亚高级总监；副国务卿政治事务高级顾问

Wang, Dong

Executive Director at Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding, Peking University
王栋，北京大学中外人文交流研究基地执行主任

Wei, Wei (Ambassador)

Former Chinese Ambassador to India
魏苇大使，前中国驻印度大使

Wisner, Frank (Ambassador)

Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, former U.S. Ambassador to India, the Philippines, Egypt, and Zambia
弗兰克·威斯纳大使，前美国国防部副部长（负责政策方向），前美国副国务卿（负责国际安全事务），前美国驻印度、菲律宾、埃及和赞比亚大使

Yao, Yunzhu (Major General)

Senior Advisor, China Association of Military Sciences; Former Director, Research Center for Sino-US Defense Relations of the Academy of Military Sciences.
姚云竹，退役将军，中国军事科学学会高级顾问；军事科学院中美防务关系研究中心原主任

Yu, Hongjun (Minister)

Director General, China Center for Contemporary World Studies; Vice Chairman, Chinese People's Association for Progress and Peace and Disarmament; Former Vice Minister, International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; Former Ambassador to Uzbekistan; Specially Invited Expert of the China Forum.
于洪君，当代中国与世界研究院高级研究员；中国人民争取和平与裁军协会副会长；中共中央对外联络部原副部长；中国前驻乌兹别克斯坦大使；中国论坛特邀专家。

Zhao, Suisheng

Professor, School of International Relations, University of Denver; Executive Director at Center for Chinese-American Cooperation; Founder and Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of Contemporary China*
赵穗生，美国丹佛大学国际关系学院教授，美中合作中心执行主任，《当代中国研究》期刊创办人、主编

Zoellick, Robert

Non-Executive Chairman, AllianceBernstein and Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center; former President, World Bank Group; former US Trade Representative; former Deputy Secretary of State; former White House Deputy Chief of Staff
罗伯特·佐利克，AllianceBernstein 非执行主席；哈佛大学肯尼迪学院贝尔弗中心高级研究员；世界银行集团前总裁；美国前贸易代表；前副国务卿；前白宫副幕僚长

APPENDIX II: WEBINAR AGENDAS

Session 1:

THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE COVID ERA
疫情背景下的全球秩序与区域治理

December 9, 2020

Keynote 1 主旨演讲

Keynote 2 主旨演讲

Presentations 引导发言

Moderated Discussion 自由讨论

Wrap-up and Concluding Remarks 会议闭幕与总结

Session 2:

MARITIME SECURITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
印太安全研讨

March 2, 2021

Presentations 引导发言

Moderated Discussion 自由讨论

Wrap-up and Concluding Remarks 会议闭幕与总结

Session 3:

THE NEW GEO-ECONOMICS OF ASIA
第三会期：亚洲新的地缘经济学

May 7, 2021

Introduction 开幕环节

Presentations 引导发言

Moderated Discussion 自由讨论

Wrap-up and Concluding Remarks 会议闭幕与总结

Session 4:

MANAGING STRATEGIC MISTRUST
第四会期：增进战略互信

June 3, 2021

Introduction 开幕环节

Presentations 引导发言

Moderated Discussion 自由讨论

Wrap-up and Concluding Remarks 会议闭幕与总结



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